Should broadband subsidies make existing service cheaper, or build networks where none exist? I evaluate the $14.2 billion Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and the $42.45 billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program within a unified welfare framework. I combine cross-state event-study evidence with a tract-level model of demand, pricing, and entry estimated using data on 170,419 broadband products across 66,454 census tracts. To make entry estimation feasible at this scale, I bound product-level fixed costs using moment inequalities that avoid solving the full equilibrium game. ACP reduced prices by 7 to 10 percent at its peak and shifted demand toward faster plans. BEAD’s early effects are smaller and delayed by network construction. Over a 25-year horizon, BEAD generates at least $12 in welfare gains per subsidy dollar under conservative assumptions, while ACP’s measured welfare gains roughly offset program outlays. The programs address distinct policy margins, implying a clear sequencing rule: build where deployment is unprofitable, then target affordability where low-income households remain price constrained.