Should broadband subsidies make service affordable, or build it where it does not exist? I evaluate the $14.2 billion Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and the $42.45 billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program in a unified welfare framework, combining continuous- treatment event studies with a tract-level demand-and-entry model estimated on 170,419 products across 66,454 tracts. Bounding fixed costs with moment inequalities makes nationwide entry estimation feasible without solving the full equilibrium game. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of ACP exposure lowered posted prices by 7–10 percent at peak and shifted demand toward faster plans; BEAD’s effects follow its construction timeline. A 75 percent BEAD subsidy returns $6.80–$7.22 per dollar over five years, while ACP’s recurring transfer roughly breaks even. The gains barely overlap: BEAD’s concentrate in monopoly tracts, exceeding duopoly gains tenfold, ACP’s among low-income households. The programs relax different constraints, implying a sequencing rule: build where deployment is unprofitable, then subsidize affordability where price binds.