How should governments split broadband subsidies between affordability and deployment? I study the Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program within one welfare framework. I combine cross-state event studies with a tract-level structural model of demand, pricing, and entry estimated on 170,419 products across 66,454 census tracts. I recover entry fixed costs across 727,601 provider-tier positions using a moment-inequality estimator that scales where solving the entry game would not. ACP reduced prices 7–10 percent at peak and shifted demand toward faster plans; BEAD shows smaller, lagged effects consistent with construction timelines. The programs are complements, not substitutes: BEAD's gains concentrate in unserved and monopoly tracts and are flat across income, whereas ACP's concentrate in low-income households and are flat across market structure. Each addresses a binding constraint; together they imply a sequencing rule—build where deployment is uneconomic, then target affordability where price still binds.