Should broadband subsidies make service affordable or build it where service does not exist? I evaluate the $14 billion Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and the $42 billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program using continuous-treatment event studies and a demand-and-entry model spanning more than 70,000 census tracts. I assemble five federal data sources into a new national tract-level dataset covering 727,601 potential provider-tier positions and 1,732 providers. I bound fixed costs with moment inequalities, making nationwide entry estimation feasible without solving the full equilibrium game. ACP exposure reduced posted prices by 7–10 percent at peak and shifted offerings toward faster plans, while BEAD’s effects emerge only after its construction lag, consistent with entry. A 75 percent BEAD subsidy generates roughly $7 in welfare gains per dollar of public spending over five years. In the direct-affordability counterfactual, ACP’s modeled gains roughly match its fiscal cost. The gains concentrate along different margins: BEAD’s are largest in monopoly markets, while ACP’s are greatest among low-income households. The programs are therefore complements: build where deployment is unprofitable, then subsidize affordability where price binds.