Should broadband subsidies target affordability or deployment? I study the Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program in one welfare framework, combining cross-state event studies with a tract-level structural model of demand, pricing, and entry fit to choices over 170,419 products across 66,454 census tracts. Because the entry game is intractable at this scale, I bound provider-tier fixed costs with a moment-inequality estimator that avoids computing equilibria. ACP lowered prices 7–10 percent at peak and shifted demand toward faster plans; BEAD’s effects are smaller and lagged, consistent with construction timelines. In counterfactuals, BEAD returns roughly $26 in welfare benefits per subsidy dollar over a 25-year horizon, while ACP roughly breaks even, largely transferring to households who would have subscribed anyway. The programs complement rather than substitute: where deployment requires large fixed costs, price relief and fixed-cost relief relax different binding constraints. BEAD’s gains concentrate in unserved and monopoly tracts and are flat across income; ACP’s concentrate in low-income households and are flat across market structure. The sequencing rule follows: build where deployment is uneconomic, then target affordability where price still binds.