Should broadband subsidies make existing service cheaper, or build networks where none exist? I evaluate the $14.2 billion Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and the $42.45 billion Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program in a common welfare framework. I combine cross-state event studies with a tract-level model of demand, pricing, and entry estimated on 170,419 products across 66,454 tracts. To scale entry estimation, I bound provider-tier fixed costs with moment inequalities that avoid solving the full equilibrium game. ACP lowered prices 7–10 percent at peak and shifted demand toward faster plans; BEAD’s effects are smaller and lag construction. In 25-year counterfactuals, BEAD yields at least $12 in welfare per subsidy dollar under conservative assumptions and about $26 in the baseline, while ACP’s measured gains roughly offset outlays. The programs solve different margins: build where deployment is uneconomic, then target affordability where low-income households remain price constrained.