Should broadband subsidies target affordability or deployment? I study the Affordable Connectivity Program (ACP) and the Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program in one welfare framework, combining cross-state event studies with a tract-level structural model of demand, pricing, and entry estimated on 170,419 products across 66,454 census tracts. I bound entry fixed costs across provider-tier markets with a moment-inequality estimator that scales where solving the entry game would not. ACP cut prices 7–10 percent at peak and shifted demand toward faster plans; BEAD’s effects are smaller and lagged, consistent with construction timelines. The programs complement rather than substitute for each other: BEAD’s gains concentrate in unserved and monopoly tracts and are flat across income; ACP’s concentrate in low-income households and are flat across market structure. Each addresses a binding constraint. Together they imply a sequencing rule: build where deployment is uneconomic, then target affordability where price still binds.